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ON HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION WITH EXIT 





Katz and Rapoport (2005) conclude that with linear production technology and the possibility 
of unilateral migration, region-specific shocks may increase the average level of education. 
Previously, Poutvaara (2000) derived a corresponding result with Cobb-Douglas technology 
and migration which may go in both directions. This paper shows that the exit option may 
reduce human capital formation with a quadratic production technology. 
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December 19, 2005 1 Introduction
In their recent contribution, Katz and Rapoport (2005) explore the rela-
tionship between economic volatility and human capital formation in a two-
country framework. In one country, the rate of return to human capital is
certain. In the other country, it is uncertain but of the same expected value.
Katz and Rapoport …nd that increased variability in the unstable country,
which they call undeveloped, increases investment in education there. The
reason for this is that the exit option provides an insurance for those who
have su¢ciently low migration costs.
Previously, also Poutvaara (2000) studied the e¤ect of region- speci…c
shocks on human capital formation when the regions have the same ex-
pected rate of return to human capital. Poutvaara (2000) assumes that
two regions face symmetric and opposite shocks, and both have ex ante an
identical chance of a positive and a negative shock. Also Poutvaara (2000)
…nds that the individual investment in human capital is increasing in the
magnitude of shocks when migration is allowed. Unlike Katz and Rapoport
(2005), Poutvaara (2000) assumes that migration can go in either direction.
Another di¤erence is in production technology: Katz and Rapoport (2005)
assume that production is linear in human capital, while Poutvaara (2000)
assumes a Cobb- Douglas production technology which combines human cap-
ital and a region- speci… c … xed factor. Katz and Rapoport assume ex ante
heterogeneous and risk- neutral individuals, while Poutvaara (2000) assumes
that those who became educated are ex ante identical and that they may be
risk- averse. The third di¤erence is that Poutvaara (2000) allows everyone to
emigrate, while Katz and Rapoport (2005) assume that the costs of adjust-
ment and preferences for living in the home country restrict emigration.
This comment extends the … nding by Poutvaara (2000) and Katz and
Rapoport (2005) by showing that the results that they derive with linear
and Cobb- Douglas production technology may be reversed with other pro-
duction technologies. The comment follows Katz and Rapoport (2005) by
focusing on risk- neutral individuals in the absence of taxation. As Poutvaara
(2000), the comment derives the results when individuals are ex ante iden-
tical. The results could be easily generalized to the case of ex ante di¤erent
productivities, in line with the appendix A in Köthenbürger and Poutvaara
(forthcoming).
12 The Model
2.1 A Cobb- Douglas Technology
There are two countries, A and B. In both countries, production combines
a …xed factor and human capital. Denoting human capital in country i,
i 2f A;Bg by Hi, the total production is Hﬁ
i , where 0 <ﬁ<1 . As in
Wildasin (1995) and Poutvaara (2000), both regions face uncertainty about
the price of the exported goods. This uncertainty may take two values: prices
are high when they are 1+v and low when they are 1¡v, where the volatility
term v satis…es 0 · v<1 . There are no taxes.
In both countries, the total population is normalized to unity. Invest-
ments in education are made before region- speci… c shocks are revealed. How-
ever, the educated migrate costlessly. They take into account that migration
equalizes the marginal productivity of human capital in the two countries.
Denoting the country which faces a positive (negative) shock by P (N), we
can write the migration equilibrium condition as
(1 ¡ v)ﬁH
ﬁ¡1
N =( 1+v) ﬁH
ﬁ¡1
P : (1)
In both countries, individuals invest in education to maximize their ex-
p e c t e di n c o m e . I n v e s t m e n ti ne d u c a t i o ni sd e n o t e db ye . The resulting
individual human capital is denoted by h(e). The marginal productivity of
investment in education is positive and non- increasing, so that h0 > 0 and
h00 · 0. Individuals decide privately on their own investment in education,
taking the market rate of return as given. This follows as there is a con-
















By inserting (1), this yields the … rst- order condition
¡1+h
0( e i)(1 ¡ v)ﬁH
ﬁ¡1
N =0 : (3)
As all individuals face the identical optimization problem, they all choose
an identical education in both countries. From now on, denote this by b e. The
condition that pre- migration and post- migration stocks of human capital are
equal is
2HN + HP =2 h ( b e ) : (4)
Note that the total value of production in the two regions is (1+v)Hﬁ
P+
(1 ¡ v)Hﬁ
N. Solving HN and HP from (4) and (1), we obtain as the total





































Therefore, an increased volatility increases the total value of production
in the two countries with any given investment in education. As a constant
fraction ﬁ of this production accrues to the educated, this implies that the
rate of return to any given stock of human capital increases. As investment in
education equalizes the marginal cost and the return, this implies an increase
in the investment in education. We can summarize the result as
Proposition 1 With a Cobb- Douglas production technology, the investment
in education is increasing in the magnitude of symmetric and opposite region-
speci…c shocks.
Note that as ﬁ approaches unity, the production technology approaches
the linear case. In the linear case, the marginal productivity of all human
capital would equal that of the country experiencing a positive shock. There-
fore, an increase in the positive shock would increase investment in human
capital, in line with the … ndings by Katz and Rapoport (2005).
2.2 A Quadratic Production Function
Assume next that the production technology is quadratic. The total pro-
duction in country i is aHi ¡ bH2
i . The region- speci…c shocks are the same
as in the case of a Cobb- Douglas technology. Denoting again the country
3which faces a positive (negative) shock by P (N), we can write the migration
equilibrium condition as
(1 ¡ v)(a ¡ 2bHN)=( 1+v)(a ¡ 2bHP): (5)





(1 ¡ v)(a ¡ 2bHN)+
1
2
( 1+v)(a ¡ 2bHP)
¸
:
By inserting (5), this yields the … rst- order condition
¡1+h
0( e i)(1 ¡ v)(a ¡ 2bHN)=0 :
As the maximization problem is the same in both ex ante identical coun-
tries, the solutions are identical. Solving HP from (4) and inserting it into
(5) yields
HN = h(b e) ¡
v
2b
(a ¡ 2bh(b e)):
The rate of return to human capital is then
(1 ¡ v)(a ¡ 2bHN) = (1 ¡ v
2)(a ¡ 2bh(b e)):
Note that this is both the expected and the realized rate of return: as
the two countries face opposite shocks, there is no uncertainty about the





2)(a ¡ 2bh(b e))
¤
= ¡2v(a ¡ 2bh(b e)): (6)
Note that a ¡ 2bh(ei) has to be positive, as otherwise the marginal pro-
ductivity of human capital would be negative. The right- hand side of (6)
is thus negative. This implies that with any given investment in education,
an increase in the region- speci…c shocks reduces the expected rate of return
to human capital investment. Thus, it would reduce investment in human
capital. We can summarize the result as
Proposition 2 With a quadratic production technology, the investment in
education is decreasing in the magnitude of symmetric and opposite region-
speci…c shocks.
4Contrary to the …nding with linear and Cobb- Douglas production tech-
nologies, region- speci… c shocks would reduce investment in human capital
with a quadratic production technology.
3 Conclusion
Previous literature has concluded that the possibility of migration boosts
human capital formation with region- speci…c shocks (see Poutvaara (2000)
and Katz and Rapoport (2005) for analysis of countries with same expected
returns to education, and references therein on contributions where the ex-
pected rates of return di¤er). This paper shows that this result is sensitive
to the assumptions about the production technology. The results that Pout-
vaara (2000) derives with a Cobb- Douglas technology and Katz and Rapoport
(2005) with a linear production technology may be reversed with quadratic
production technology.
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